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Abstract
One of the defining features of a cryptocurrency is
that its ledger, containing all transactions that have ever
taken place, is globally visible. As one consequence
of this degree of transparency, a long line of recent re-
search has demonstrated that — even in cryptocurrencies
that are specifically designed to improve anonymity —
it is often possible to track money as it changes hands,
and in some cases to de-anonymize users entirely. With
the recent proliferation of alternative cryptocurrencies,
however, it becomes relevant to ask not only whether or
not money can be traced as it moves within the ledger
of a single cryptocurrency, but if it can in fact be traced
as it moves across ledgers. This is especially pertinent
given the rise in popularity of automated trading plat-
forms such as ShapeShift, which make it effortless to
carry out such cross-currency trades. In this paper, we
use data scraped from ShapeShift over a thirteen-month
period and the data from eight different blockchains to
explore this question. Beyond developing new heuris-
tics and creating new types of links across cryptocur-
rency ledgers, we also identify various patterns of cross-
currency trades and of the general usage of these plat-
forms, with the ultimate goal of understanding whether
they serve a criminal or a profit-driven agenda.
1 Introduction
For the past decade, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin
have been touted for their transformative potential, both
as a new form of electronic cash and as a platform to
“re-decentralize” aspects of the Internet and comput-
ing in general. In terms of their role as cash, how-
ever, it has been well established by now that the us-
age of pseudonyms in Bitcoin does not achieve mean-
ingful levels of anonymity [17, 18, 1, 11, 21], which casts
doubt on its role as a payment mechanism. Furthermore,
the ability to track flows of coins is not limited to Bit-
coin: it extends even to so-called “privacy coins” like
Dash [10, 12], Monero [13, 7, 4, 24], and Zcash [16, 6]
that incorporate features explicitly designed to improve
on Bitcoin’s anonymity guarantees.
Traditionally, criminals attempting to cash out illicit
funds would have to use exchanges; indeed, most track-
ing techniques rely on identifying the addresses associ-
ated with these exchanges as a way to observe when these
deposits happen [11]. Nowadays, however, exchanges
typically implement strict Know Your Customer/Anti-
Money Laundering (KYC/AML) policies to comply with
regulatory requirements, meaning criminals (and indeed
all users) risk revealing their real identities when using
them. Users also run risks when storing their coins in
accounts at custodial exchanges, as exchanges may be
hacked or their coins may otherwise become inaccessi-
ble [9, 19]. As an alternative, there have emerged in
the past few years frictionless trading platforms such as
ShapeShift1 and Changelly,2 in which users are able to
trade between cryptocurrencies without having to store
their coins with the platform provider. Furthermore,
while ShapeShift now requires users to have verified ac-
counts [22], this was not the case before October 2018.
Part of the reason for these trading platforms to exist
is the sheer rise in the number of different cryptocur-
rencies: according to the popular cryptocurrency data
tracker CoinMarketCap there were 36 cryptocurrencies
in September 2013, only 7 of which had a stated market
capitalization of over 1 million USD,3 whereas in Jan-
uary 2019 there were 2117 cryptocurrencies, of which
the top 10 had a market capitalization of over 100 mil-
lion USD. Given this proliferation of new cryptocurren-
cies and platforms that make it easy to transact across
them, it becomes important to consider not just whether
or not flows of coins can be tracked within the transac-
tion ledger of a given currency, but also if they can be
tracked as coins move across their respective ledgers as
1https://shapeshift.io
2https://changelly.com
3https://coinmarketcap.com/historical/20130721/
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well. This is especially important given that there are
documented cases of criminals attempting to use these
cross-currency trades to obscure the flow of their coins:
the WannaCry ransomware operators, for example, were
observed using ShapeShift to convert their ransomed bit-
coins into Monero [3]. More generally, these services
have the potential to offer an insight into the broader
cryptocurrency ecosystem and the thousands of curren-
cies it now contains.
In this paper, we initiate an exploration of the usage of
these cross-currency trading platforms, and the potential
they offer in terms of the ability to track flows of coins
as they move across different transaction ledgers. Here
we rely on three distinct sources of data: the cryptocur-
rency blockchains, the data collected via our own interac-
tions with these trading platforms, and — as we describe
in Section 4 — the information offered by the platforms
themselves via their public APIs.
We begin in Section 5 by identifying the specific
on-chain transactions associated with an advertised
ShapeShift transaction, which we are able to do with a
relatively high degree of success (identifying both the
deposit and withdrawal transactions 81.91% of the time,
on average). We then describe in Section 6 the differ-
ent transactional patterns that can be traced by identify-
ing the relevant on-chain transactions, focusing specif-
ically on patterns that may be indicative of trading or
money laundering, and on the ability to link addresses
across different currency ledgers. We then move in Sec-
tion 7 to consider both old and new heuristics for cluster-
ing together addresses associated with ShapeShift, with
particular attention paid to our new heuristic concern-
ing the common social relationships revealed by the us-
age of ShapeShift. Finally, we bring all the analysis to-
gether by applying it to several case studies in Section 8.
Again, our particular focus in this last section is on the
phenomenon of trading and other profit-driven activity,
and the extent to which usage of the ShapeShift platform
seems to be motivated by criminal activity or a more gen-
eral desire for anonymity.
2 Related Work
We are not aware of any other research exploring these
cross-currency trading platforms, but consider as related
all research that explores the level of anonymity achieved
by cryptocurrencies. This work is complementary to our
own, as the techniques it develops can be combined with
ours to track the entire flow of cryptocurrencies as they
move both within and across different ledgers.
Much of the earlier research in this vein focused on
Bitcoin [17, 18, 1, 11, 21], and operates by adopting the
so-called “multi-input” heuristic, which says that all in-
put addresses in a transaction belong to the same entity
(be it an individual or a service such as an exchange).
While the accuracy of this heuristic has been some-
what eroded by privacy-enhancing techniques like Coin-
Join [8], new techniques have been developed to avoid
such false positives [12], and as such it has now been
accepted as standard and incorporated into many tools
for Bitcoin blockchain analytics.45 Once addresses are
clustered together in this manner, the entity can then fur-
ther be identified using hand-collected tags that form a
ground-truth dataset. We adopt both of these techniques
in order to analyze the clusters formed by ShapeShift and
Changelly in a variety of cryptocurrency blockchains, al-
though as described in Section 7 we find them to be rel-
atively unsuccessful in this setting.
In response to the rise of newer “privacy coins”, a
recent line of research has also worked to demonstrate
that the deployed versions of these cryptocurrencies have
various properties that diminish the level of anonymity
they achieve in practice. This includes work targeting
Dash [12, 10], Monero [13, 7, 4, 24], and Zcash [16, 6].
In terms of Dash, its main privacy feature is similar to
CoinJoin, in which different senders join forces to cre-
ate a single transaction representing their transfer to a
diverse set of recipients. Despite the intention for this to
hide which recipient addresses belong to which senders,
research has demonstrated that such links can in fact be
created based on the value being transacted [12, 10].
Monero, which allows senders to hide which input be-
longs to them by using “mix-ins” consisting of the keys
of other users, is vulnerable to de-anonymization attacks
exploiting the (now-obsolete) case in which some users
chose not to use mix-ins, or exploiting inferences about
the age of the coins used as mix-ins [13, 7, 4, 24]. Fi-
nally, Zcash is similar to Bitcoin, but with the addition
of a privacy feature called the shielded pool, which can
be used to hide the values and addresses of the senders
and recipients involved in a transaction. Recent research
has shown that it is possible to significantly reduce the
anonymity set provided by the shielded pool, by devel-
oping simple heuristics for identifying links between hid-
den and partly obscured transactions [16, 6].
3 Background
3.1 Cryptocurrencies
The first decentralized cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, was cre-
ated by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 [14] and deployed in
January 2009. At the most basic level, bitcoins are dig-
ital assets that can be traded between sets of users with-
out the need for any trusted intermediary. Bitcoins can
be thought of as being stored in a public key, which is
4https://www.chainalysis.com/
5https://www.elliptic.co/
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controlled by the entity in possession of the associated
private key. A single user can store their assets across
many public keys, which act as pseudonyms with no in-
herent link to the user’s identity. In order to spend them,
a user can form and cryptographically sign a transaction
that acts to send the bitcoins to a recipient of their choice.
Beyond Bitcoin, other platforms now offer more robust
functionality. For example, Ethereum allows users to de-
ploy smart contracts onto the blockchain, which act as
stateful programs that can be triggered by transactions
providing inputs to their functions.
In order to prevent double-spending, many cryptocur-
rencies are UTXO-based, meaning coins are associated
not with an address but with a uniquely identifiable
UTXO (unspent transaction output) that is created for all
outputs in a given transaction. This means that one ad-
dress could be associated with potentially many UTXOs
(corresponding to each time it has received coins), and
that inputs to transactions are also UTXOs rather than
addresses. Checking for double-spending is then just a
matter of checking if an input is in the current UTXO‘set,
and removing it from the set once it spends it contents.
3.2 Digital asset trading platforms
In contrast to a traditional (custodial) exchange, a digital
asset trading platform allows users to move between dif-
ferent cryptocurrencies without storing any money in an
account with the service; in other words, users keep their
own money in their own accounts and the platform has it
only at the time that a trade is being executed. To initiate
such a trade, a user approaches the service and selects a
supported input currency curIn (i.e., the currency from
which they would like to move money) and a supported
output currency curOut (the currency that they would
like to obtain). A user additionally specifies a destina-
tion address addru in the curOut blockchain, which is the
address to which the output currency will be sent. The
service then presents the user with an exchange rate rate
and an address addrs in the curIn blockchain to which
to send money, as well as a miner fee fee that accounts
for the transaction it must form in the curOut blockchain.
The user then sends to this address addrs the amount amt
in curIn they wish to convert, and after some delay the
service sends the appropriate amount of the output cur-
rency to the specified destination address addru. This
means that an interaction with these services results in
two transactions: one on the curIn blockchain sending
amt to addrs, and one on the curOut blockchain sending
(roughly) rate ·amt− fee to addru.
This describes an interaction with an abstracted
platform. Today, the two best-known examples are
ShapeShift and Changelly. Whereas Changelly has al-
ways required account creation, ShapeShift introduced
this requirement only in October 2018. Each plat-
form supports dozens of cryptocurrencies, ranging from
better-known ones such as Bitcoin and Ethereum to
lesser-known ones such as FirstBlood and Clams. In Sec-
tion 4, we describe in more depth the operations of these
specific platforms and our own interactions with them.
4 Data Collection and Statistics
In this section, we describe our data sources, as well as
some preliminary statistics about the collected data. We
begin in Section 4.1 by describing our own interactions
with Changelly, a trading platform with a limited per-
sonal API. We then describe in Section 4.2 both our own
interactions with ShapeShift, and the data we were able
to scrape from their public API, which provided us with
significant insight into their overall set of transactions.
Finally, we describe in Section 4.3 our collection of the
data backing eight different cryptocurrencies.
4.1 Changelly
Changelly offers a simple API6 that allows registered
users to carry out transactions with the service. Us-
ing this API, we engaged in 22 transactions, using the
most popular ShapeShift currencies (Table 1) to guide
our choices for curIn and curOut.
While doing these transactions, we observed that
they would sometimes take up to an hour to complete.
This is because Changelly attempts to minimize double-
spending risk by requiring users to wait for a set number
of confirmations (shown to the user at the time of their
transaction) in the curIn blockchain before executing the
transfer on the curOut blockchain. We used this obser-
vation to guide our choice of parameters in our identifi-
cation of on-chain transactions in Section 5.
4.2 ShapeShift
ShapeShift’s API7 allows users to execute their own
transactions, of which we did 18 in total. As with
Changelly, we were able to gain some valuable insights
about the operation of the platform via these personal
interactions. Whereas ShapeShift did not disclose the
number of confirmations they waited for on the curIn
blockchain, we again observed long delays, indicating
that they were also waiting for a sufficient number.
Beyond these personal interactions, the API provides
information on the operation of the service as a whole.
Most notably, it provides three separate pieces of infor-
mation: (1) the current trading rate between any pair of
6https://api-docs.changelly.com/
7https://info.shapeshift.io/api
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cryptocurrencies, (2) a list of up to 50 of the most re-
cent transactions that have taken place (across all users),
and (3) full details of a specific ShapeShift transaction
given the address addrs in the curIn blockchain (i.e., the
address to which the user sent their coins).
For the trading rates, ShapeShift provides the
following information for all cryptocurrency pairs
(curIn,curOut): the rate, the limit (i.e., the maximum
that can be exchanged), the minimum that can be ex-
changed, and the miner fee (denominated in curOut).
For the 50 most recent transactions, information is pro-
vided in the form: (curIn,curOut,amt, t, id), where the
first three of these are as discussed in Section 3.2, t is a
UNIX timestamp, and id is an internal identifier for this
transaction. For the transaction information, when pro-
vided with a specific addrs ShapeShift provides the tu-
ple (status,address,withdraw, inCoin, inType,outCoin,
outType, tx, txURL,error). The status field is a flag that
is either complete, to mean the transaction was success-
ful; error, to mean an issue occurred with the trans-
action or the queried address was not a ShapeShift ad-
dress; or no_deposits, to mean a user initiated a trans-
action but did not send any coins. The error field appears
when an error is returned and gives a reason for the er-
ror. The address field is the same address addrs used
by ShapeShift, and withdraw is the address addru (i.e.,
the user’s recipient address in the curOut blockchain).
inType and outType are the respective curIn and curOut
currencies and inCoin is the amt received. outCoin is the
amount sent in the curOut blockchain. Finally, tx is the
transaction hash in the curOut blockchain and txURL is
a link to this transaction in an online explorer.
Using a simple Web scraper, we downloaded the trans-
actions and rates every five seconds for close to thirteen
months: from November 27 2017 until December 23
2018. This resulted in a set of 2,843,238 distinct trans-
actions. Interestingly, we noticed that several earlier test
transactions we did with the platform did not show up
in their list of recent transactions, which suggests that
their published transactions may in fact underestimate
their overall activity.
4.2.1 ShapeShift currencies
In terms of the different cryptocurrencies used in
ShapeShift transactions, their popularity was distributed
as seen in Figure 1. As this figure depicts, the overall
activity of ShapeShift is (perhaps unsurprisingly) corre-
lated with the price of Bitcoin in the same time period. At
the same time, there is a decline in the number of trans-
actions after KYC was introduced that is not clearly cor-
related with the price of Bitcoin (which is largely steady
and declines only several months later).
ShapeShift supports dozens of cryptocurrencies, and
Figure 1: The total number of transactions per day reported via
ShapeShift’s API, and the numbers broken down by cryptocur-
rency (where a transaction is attributed to a coin if it is used
as either curIn or curOut). The dotted red line indicates the
BTC-USD exchange rate, and the horizontal dotted black line
indicates when KYC was introduced into ShapeShift.
Currency Abbr. Total curIn curOut
Ethereum ETH 1,385,509 892,971 492,538
Bitcoin BTC 1,286,772 456,703 830,069
Litecoin LTC 720,047 459,042 261,005
Bitcoin Cash BCH 284,514 75,774 208,740
Dogecoin DOGE 245,255 119,532 125,723
Dash DASH 187,869 113,272 74,597
Ethereum Classic ETC 179,998 103,177 76,821
Zcash ZEC 154,142 111,041 43,101
Table 1: The eight most popular coins used on ShapeShift, in
terms of the total units traded, and the respective units traded
with that coin as curIn and curOut.
in our data we observed the use of 65 different ones. The
most commonly used coins are shown in Table 1. It is
clear that Bitcoin and Ethereum are the most heavily used
currencies, which is perhaps not surprising given the rel-
ative ease with which they can be exchanged with fiat
currencies on more traditional exchanges, and their rank
in terms of market capitalization.
4.3 Blockchain data
For the cryptocurrencies we were interested in exploring
further, it was also necessary to download and parse the
respective blockchains, in order to identify the on-chain
transactional behavior of ShapeShift and Changelly. It
was not feasible to do this for all 65 currencies used on
ShapeShift (not to mention that given the low volume of
transactions for many of them, it would likely not yield
additional insights anyway), so we chose to focus instead
on just the top 8, as seen in Table 1. Together, these
account for 95.7% of all ShapeShift transactions if only
one of curIn and/or curOut is one of the eight, and 60.5%
if both are.
For each of these currencies, we ran a full node in
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order to download the entire blockchain. For the ones
supported by the BlockSci tool [5] (Bitcoin, Dash and
Zcash), we used it to parse and analyze their blockchains.
BlockSci does not, however, support the remaining five
currencies. For these we thus parsed the blockchains us-
ing Python scripts, stored the data as Apache Spark par-
quet files, and analyzed them using custom scripts. In to-
tal, we ended up working with 654 GB of raw blockchain
data and 434 GB of parsed blockchain data.
5 Identifying Blockchain Transactions
In order to gain deeper insights about the way these trad-
ing platforms are used, it is necessary to identify not just
their internal transactions but also the transactions that
appear on the blockchains of the traded currencies. This
section presents heuristics for identifying these on-chain
transactions, and the next section explores the additional
insights these transactions can offer.
Recall from Section 3.2 that an interaction with
ShapeShift results in the deposit of coins from the user to
the service on the curIn blockchain (which we refer to as
“Phase 1”), and the withdrawal of coins from the service
to the user on the curOut blockchain (“Phase 2”). To
start with Phase 1, we thus seek to identify the deposit
transaction on the input (curIn) blockchain. Similarly to
Portnoff et al. [15], we consider two main requirements
for identifying the correct on-chain transaction: (1) that
it occurred reasonably close in time to the point at which
it was advertised via the API, and (2) that the value it
carried was identical to the advertised amount.
For this first requirement, we look for candidate trans-
actions as follows. Given a ShapeShift transaction with
timestamp t, we first find the block b (at some height h)
on the curIn blockchain that was mined at the time clos-
est to t. We then look at the transactions in all blocks
with height in the range [h−δb,h+δa], where δb and δa
are parameters specific to curIn. We looked at both ear-
lier and later blocks based on the observation in our own
interactions that the timestamp published by ShapeShift
would sometimes be earlier and sometimes be later than
the on-chain transaction.
For each of our eight currencies, we ran this heuristic
for every ShapeShift transaction using curIn as the cur-
rency in question, with every possible combination of δb
and δa ranging from 0 to 30. This resulted in a set of can-
didate transactions with zero hits (meaning no matching
transactions were found), a single hit, or multiple hits.
To rule out false positives, we initially considered as suc-
cessful only ShapeShift transactions with a single candi-
date on-chain transaction, although we describe below an
augmented heuristic that is able to tolerate multiple hits.
We then used the values of δb and δa that maximized the
number of single-hit transactions for each currency. As
seen in Table 2, the optimal choice of these parameters
varies significantly across currencies, according to their
different block rates; typically we needed to look further
before or after for currencies in which blocks were pro-
duced more frequently.
In order to validate the results of our heuristic
for Phase 1, we use the additional capability of the
ShapeShift API described in Section 4.2. In particu-
lar, we queried the API on the recipient address of ev-
ery transaction identified by our heuristic for Phase 1.
If the response of the API was affirmative, we flagged
the recipient address as belonging to ShapeShift and we
identified the transaction in which it received coins as
the curIn transaction. This also provided a way to iden-
tify the corresponding Phase 2 transaction on the curOut
blockchain, as it is just the tx field returned by the API.
As we proceed only in the case that the API returns a
valid result, we gain ground-truth data in both Phase 1
and Phase 2. In other words, this method serves to not
only validate our results in Phase 1 but also provides a
way to identify Phase 2 transactions.
The heuristic described above is able to handle only
single hits; i.e., the case in which there is only a sin-
gle candidate transaction. Luckily, it is easy to augment
this heuristic by again using the API. For example, as-
sume we examine a BTC-ETH ShapeShift transaction
and we find three candidate transactions in the Bitcoin
blockchain after applying the basic heuristic described
above. To identify which of these transactions is the
right one, we simply query the API on all three recipient
addresses and check that the status field is affirmative
(meaning ShapeShift recognizes this address) and that
the outType field is ETH. In the vast majority of cases
this uniquely identifies the correct transaction out of the
candidate set, meaning we can use the API to both vali-
date our results (i.e., we use it to eliminate potential false
positives, as described above) and to augment the heuris-
tic by being able to tolerate multiple candidate transac-
tions. The augmented results for Phase 1 can be found
in the last column of Table 2 and clearly demonstrate the
benefit of this extra usage of the API. In the most dra-
matic example, we were able to go from identifying the
on-chain transactions for ShapeShift transactions involv-
ing Bitcoin 65.75% of the time with the basic heuristic to
identifying them 76.86% of the time with the augmented
heuristic.
5.1 Accuracy of our heuristics
False negatives can occur for both of our heuristics when
there are either too many or too few matching transac-
tions in the searched block interval. These are more com-
mon for the basic heuristic, as described above and seen
in Table 2, because it is conservative in identifying an on-
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Currency Parameters Basic % Augmented %
δb δa
BTC 0 1 65.76 76.86
BCH 9 4 76.96 80.23
DASH 5 5 84.77 88.65
DOGE 1 4 76.94 81.69
ETH 5 0 72.15 81.63
ETC 5 0 76.61 78.67
LTC 1 2 71.61 76.97
ZEC 1 3 86.94 90.54
Table 2: For the selected (optimal) parameters and for a given
currency used as curIn, the percentage of ShapeShift transac-
tions for which we found matching on-chain transactions for
both the basic (time- and value-based) and the augmented (API-
based) Phase 1 heuristic. The augmented heuristic uses the
API and thus also represents our success in identifying Phase 2
transactions.
chain transaction only when there is one candidate. This
rate could be improved by increasing the searched block
radius, at the expense of adding more computation and
potentially increasing the false positive rate.
False positives can occur for both of our heuristics if
someone sends the same amount as the ShapeShift trans-
action at roughly the same time, but this transaction falls
within our searched interval whereas the ShapeShift one
doesn’t. In theory, this should not be an issue for our aug-
mented heuristic, since the API will make it clear that
the candidate transaction is not in fact associated with
ShapeShift. In a small number of cases (fewer than 1% of
all ShapeShift transactions), however, the API returned
details of a transaction with different characteristics than
the one we were attempting to identify; e.g., it had a dif-
ferent pair of currencies or a different value being sent.
This happened because ShapeShift allows users to re-use
an existing deposit address, and the API returns only the
latest transaction using a given address.
If we blindly took the results of the API, then this
would lead to false positives in our augmented heuris-
tic for both Phase 1 and Phase 2. We thus ensured that
the transaction returned by the API had three things in
common with the ShapeShift transaction: (1) the pair of
currencies, (2) the amount being sent, and (3) the timing,
within the interval specified in Table 2. If there was any
mismatch, we discarded the transaction. For example,
given a ShapeShift transaction indicating an ETH-BTC
shift carrying 1 ETH and occurring at time t, we looked
for all addresses that received 1 ETH at time t or up to
5 blocks earlier. We then queried the API on these ad-
dresses and kept only those transactions which reported
shifting 1 ETH to BTC. While our augmented heuristic
still might produce false positives in the case that a user
quickly makes two different transactions using the same
currency pair, value, and deposit address, we view this as
unlikely, especially given the relatively long wait times
we observed ourselves when using the service (as men-
tioned in Section 4.2).
5.2 Alternative Phase 2 identification
Given that our heuristic for Phase 2 involved just query-
ing the API for the corresponding Phase 1 transaction,
it is natural to wonder what would be possible without
this feature of the API, or indeed if there are any alter-
native strategies for identifying Phase 2 transactions. In-
deed, it is possible to use a similar heuristic for identify-
ing Phase 1 transactions, by first looking for transactions
in blocks that were mined close to the advertised transac-
tion time, and then looking for ones in which the amount
was close to the expected amount. Here the amount must
be estimated according to the advertised amt, rate, and
fee. In theory, the amount sent should be amt · rate− fee,
although in practice the rate can fluctuate so it is impor-
tant to look for transactions carrying a total value within
a reasonable error rate of this amount.
When we implemented and applied this heuristic, we
found that our accuracy in identifying Phase 2 trans-
actions decreased significantly, due to the larger set of
transactions that carried an amount within a wider range
(as opposed to an exact amount, as in Phase 1) and the
inability of this type of heuristic to handle multiple can-
didate transactions. More importantly, this approach pro-
vides no ground-truth information at all: by choosing
conservative parameters it is possible to limit the number
of false positives, but this is at the expense of the false
negative rate (as, again, we observed in our own applica-
tion of this heuristic) and in general it is not guaranteed
that the final set of transactions really are associated with
ShapeShift. As this is the exact guarantee we can get by
using the API, we continue in the rest of the paper with
the results we obtained there, but nevertheless mention
this alternative approach in case this feature of the API is
discontinued or otherwise made unavailable.
6 Tracking Cross-Currency Activity
In the previous section, we saw that it was possible in
many cases to identify the on-chain transactions, in both
the curIn and curOut blockchains, associated with the
transactions advertised by ShapeShift. In this section, we
take this a step further and show how linking these trans-
actions can be used to identify more complex patterns of
behavior.
As shown in Figure 2, we consider these for three
main types of transactions. In particular, we look at (1)
pass-through transactions, which represent the full flow
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Figure 2: The different transactional patterns, according to how they interact with ShapeShift and which phases are required to
identify them.
of money as it moves from one currency to the other via
the deposit and withdrawal transactions; (2) U-turns, in
which a user who has shifted into one currency immedi-
ately shifts back; and (3) round-trip transactions, which
are essentially a combination of the first two and follow
a user’s flow of money as it moves from one currency to
another and then back to the original one. Our interest in
these particular patterns of behavior is largely based on
the role they play in tracking money as it moves across
the ledgers of different cryptocurrencies. In particular,
our goal is to test the validity of the implicit assump-
tion made by criminal usage of the platform — such as
we examine further in Section 8 — that ShapeShift pro-
vides additional anonymity beyond simply transacting in
a given currency.
In more detail, identifying pass-through transactions
allows us to create a link between the input address(es)
in the deposit on the curIn blockchain and the output ad-
dress(es) in the withdrawal on the curOut blockchain.
Identifying U-turns allows us to see when a user has
interacted with ShapeShift not because they are inter-
ested in holding units of the curOut cryptocurrency, but
because they see other benefits in shifting coins back
and forth. There are several possible motivations for
this: for example, traders may quickly shift back and
forth between two different cryptocurrencies in order to
profit from differences in their price. We investigate
this possibility in Section 8.3. Similarly, people per-
forming money laundering or otherwise holding “dirty”
money may engage in such behavior under the belief that
once the coins are moved back into the curIn blockchain,
they are “clean” after moving through ShapeShift re-
gardless of what happened with the coins in the curOut
blockchain.
Finally, identifying round-trip transactions allows us
to create a link between the input address(es) in the de-
posit on the curIn blockchain with the output address(es)
in the later withdrawal on the curIn blockchain. Again,
there are many reasons why users might engage in such
behavior, including the trading and money laundering ex-
amples given above. As another example, if a curIn user
wanted to make an anonymous payment to another curIn
user, they might attempt to do so via a round-trip trans-
action (using the address of the other user in the sec-
Figure 3: For each pair of currencies, the number of transac-
tions we identified as being a pass-through from one to the
other, as a percentage of the total number of transactions be-
tween those two currencies.
ond pass-through transaction), under the same assump-
tion that ShapeShift would sever the link between their
two addresses.
6.1 Pass-through transactions
Given a ShapeShift transaction from curIn to curOut, the
methods from Section 5 already provide a way to iden-
tify pass-through transactions, as depicted in Figure 2a.
In particular, running the augmented heuristic for Phase 1
transactions identifies not only the deposit transaction in
the curIn blockchain but also the Phase 2 transaction (i.e.,
the withdrawal transaction in the curOut blockchain),
as this is exactly what is returned by the API. As dis-
cussed above, this has the effect on anonymity of trac-
ing the flow of funds across this ShapeShift transaction
and linking its two endpoints; i.e., the input address(es)
in the curIn blockchain with the output address(es) in
the curOut blockchain. The results, in terms of the
percentages of all possible transactions between a pair
(curIn,curOut) for which we found the corresponding
on-chain transactions, are in Figure 3.
The figure demonstrates that our success in iden-
tifying these types of transactions varied somewhat,
and depended — not unsurprisingly — on our success in
identifying transactions in the curIn blockchain. This
means that we were typically least successful with curIn
blockchains with higher transaction volumes, such as
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Bitcoin, because we frequently ended up with multiple
hits (although here we were still able to identify more
than 74% of transactions). In contrast, the dark stripes
for Dash and Zcash demonstrate our high level of suc-
cess in identifying pass-through transactions with those
currencies as curIn, due to our high level of success in
their Phase 1 analysis in general (89% and 91% respec-
tively). In total, across all eight currencies we were able
to identify 1,383,666 pass-through transactions.
6.2 U-turns
As depicted in Figure 2b, we consider a U-turn to be
a pattern in which a user has just sent money from
curIn to curOut, only to turn around and go immedi-
ately back to curIn. This means linking two transactions:
the Phase 2 transaction used to send money to curOut
and the Phase 1 transaction used to send money back to
curIn. In terms of timing and amount, we require that
the second transaction happens within 30 minutes of the
first, and that it carries within 1% of the value that was
generated by the first Phase 2 transaction. This value is
returned by the ShapeShift API in the outCoin field.
While the close timing and amount already give some
indication that these two transactions are linked, it is of
course possible that this is a coincidence and they were
in fact carried out by different users. In order to gain
additional confidence that it was the same user, we have
two options. In UTXO-based cryptocurrencies (see Sec-
tion 3.1), we could see if the input is the same UTXO
that was created in the Phase 2 transaction, and thus see
if a user is spending the coin immediately. In cryptocur-
rencies based instead on accounts, such as Ethereum, we
have no choice but to look just at the addresses. Here
we thus define a U-turn as seeing if the address that was
used as the output in the Phase 2 transaction is used as
the input in the later Phase 1 transaction.
Once we identified such candidate pairs of transac-
tions (tx1, tx2), we then ran the augmented heuristic from
Section 5 to identify the relevant output address in the
curOut blockchain, according to tx1. We then ran the
same heuristic to identify the relevant input address in
the curOut blockchain, this time according to tx2.
In fact though, what we really identified in Phase 2
was not just an address but, as described above, a newly
created UTXO. If the input used in tx2 was this same
UTXO, then we found a U-turn according to the first
heuristic. If instead it corresponded just to the same
address, then we found a U-turn according to the sec-
ond heuristic. The results of both of these heuristics, in
addition to the basic identification of U-turns according
to the timing and amount, can be found in Table 3, and
plots showing their cumulative number over time can be
found in Figures 4 and 5. In total, we identified 107,267
Currency # (basic) # (addr) # (utxo)
BTC 36,666 565 314
BCH 2864 196 81
DASH 3234 2091 184
DOGE 546 75 75
ETH 53,518 5248 -
ETC 1397 543 -
LTC 8270 1429 244
ZEC 772 419 222
Table 3: The number of U-turns identified for each cryptocur-
rency, according to our basic heuristic concerning timing and
value, and both the address-based and UTXO-based heuristics
concerning identical ownership. Since Ethereum and Ethereum
Classic are account-based, the UTXO heuristic cannot be ap-
plied to them.
Figure 4: The total number of U-turns over time, as identified
by our basic heuristic.
U-turns according to our basic heuristic, 10,566 U-turns
according to our address-based heuristic, and 1,120 U-
turns according to our UTXO-based heuristic.
While the dominance of both Bitcoin and Ethereum
should be expected given their overall trading domi-
nance, we also observe that both Dash and Zcash have
been used extensively as “mixer coins” in U-turns, and
are in fact more popular for this purpose than they are
overall. Despite this indication that users may prefer to
use privacy coins as the mixing intermediary, Zcash has
the highest percentage of identified UTXO-based U-turn
transactions. Thus, these users not only do not gain ex-
tra anonymity by using it, but in fact are easily identifi-
able given that they did not change the address used in
419 out of 772 (54.24%) cases, or — even worse — im-
mediately shifted back the exact same coin they received
in 222 (28.75%) cases. In the case of Dash, the results
suggest something a bit different. Once more, the usage
of a privacy coin was not very successful since in 2091
out of the 3234 cases the address that received the fresh
coins was the same as the one that shifted it back. It was
the exact same coin in only 184 cases, however, which
suggests that although the user is the same, there is a lo-
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Figure 5: The total number of U-turns over time, as identi-
fied by our address-based (in red) and UTXO-based (in blue)
heuristics.
cal Dash transaction between the two ShapeShift trans-
actions. We defer a further discussion of this asymmetry
to Section 8.4, where we also discuss more generally the
use of anonymity features in both Zcash and Dash.
Looking at Figure 5, we can see a steep rise in the
number of U-turns that used the same address in Decem-
ber 2017, which is not true of the ones that used the same
UTXO or in the overall number of U-turns in Figure 4.
Looking into this further, we observed that the number of
U-turns was particularly elevated during this period for
four specific pairs of currencies: DASH-ETH, DASH-
LTC, ETH-DASH, and LTC-ETH. This thus affected pri-
marily the address-based heuristic due to the fact that (1)
Ethereum is account-based so the UTXO-based heuristic
does not apply, and (2) Dash has a high percentage of U-
turns using the same address, but a much smaller percent-
age using the same UTXO. The amount of money shifted
in these U-turns varied significantly in terms of the units
of the input currency, but all carried between 115K and
138K in USD. Although the ShapeShift transactions that
were involved in these U-turns had hundreds of differ-
ent addresses in the curIn blockchain, they used only a
small number of addresses in the curOut blockchain: 4
addresses in Ethereum, 13 in Dash, and 9 in Litecoin. As
we discuss further in Section 7.2, the re-use of addresses
and the fact that the total amount of money (in USD) car-
ried by the transactions was roughly the same indicates
that perhaps a small group of people was responsible for
creating this spike in the graph.
6.3 Round-trip transactions
As depicted in Figure 2c, a round-trip transaction re-
quires performing two ShapeShift transactions: one out
of the initial currency and one back into it. To identify
round-trip transactions, we effectively combine the re-
sults of the pass-through and U-turn transactions; i.e., we
tagged something as a round-trip transaction if the output
of a pass-through transaction from X to Y was identified
Currency # (regular) # (same addr)
BTC 35,019 437
BCH 1780 84
DASH 3253 2353
DOGE 378 0
ETH 45,611 4085
ETC 1122 626
LTC 6912 2733
ZEC 472 172
Table 4: The number of regular round-trip transactions identi-
fied for each cryptocurrency, and the number that use the same
initial and final address.
as being involved in a U-turn transaction, which was it-
self linked to a later pass-through transaction from Y to
X (of roughly the same amount). As described at the
beginning of the section, this has the powerful effect of
creating a link between the sender and recipient within a
single currency, despite the fact that money flowed into a
different currency in between.
In more detail, we looked for consecutive ShapeShift
transactions where for a given pair of cryptocurrencies X
and Y: (1) the first transaction was of the form X-Y; (2)
the second transaction was of the form Y-X; (3) the sec-
ond transaction happened relatively soon after the first
one; and (4) the value carried by the two transaction was
approximately the same. For the third property, we re-
quired that the second transaction happened within 30
minutes of the first. For the fourth property, we required
that if the first transaction carried x units of curIn then
the second transaction carried within 0.5% of the value
in the (on-chain) Phase 2 transaction, according to the
outCoin field provided by the API.
As with U-turns, we considered an additional restric-
tion to capture the case in which the user in the curIn
blockchain stayed the same, meaning money clearly did
not change hands. Unlike with U-turns, however, this re-
striction is less to provide accuracy for the basic heuristic
and more to isolate the behavior of people engaged in day
trading or money laundering (as opposed to those mean-
ingfully sending money to other users). For this pattern,
we identify the input addresses used in Phase 1 for the
first transaction, which represent the user who initiated
the round-trip transaction in the curIn blockchain. We
then identify the output addresses used in Phase 2 for the
second transaction, which represent the user who was the
final recipient of the funds. If the address was the same,
then it is clear that money has not changed hands. Oth-
erwise, the round-trip transaction acts as a heuristic for
linking together the input and output addresses.
The results of running this heuristic (with and without
the extra restriction) are in Table 4. In total, we identi-
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fied 95,547 round-trip transactions according to our reg-
ular heuristic, and identified 10,490 transactions where
the input and output addresses were the same. Across
different currencies, however, there was a high level of
variance in the results. While this could be a result of the
different levels of accuracy in Phase 1 for different cur-
rencies, the more likely explanation is that users indeed
engage in different patterns of behavior with different
currencies. For Bitcoin, for example, there was a very
small percentage (1.2%) of round-trip transactions that
used the same address. This suggests that either users
are aware of the general lack of anonymity in the basic
Bitcoin protocol and use ShapeShift to make anonymous
payments, or that if they do use round-trip transactions
as a form of money laundering they are at least careful
enough to change their addresses. More simply, it may
just be the case that generating new addresses is more of
a default in Bitcoin than it is in other currencies.
In other currencies, however, such as Dash, Ethereum
Classic, Litecoin, and Zcash, there were relatively high
percentages of round-trip transactions that used the same
input and output address: 72%, 56%, 40%, and 36%
respectively. In Ethereum Classic, this may be ex-
plained by the account-based nature of the currency,
which means that it is common for one entity to use
only one address, although the percentage for Ethereum
is much lower (9%). In Dash and Zcash, as we have
already seen in Section 6.2 and explore further in Sec-
tion 8.4, it may simply be the case that users assume they
achieve anonymity just through the use of a privacy coin,
so do not take extra measures to hide their identity.
7 Clustering Analysis
7.1 Shared ownership heuristic
As described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we engaged in
transactions with both ShapeShift and Changelly, which
provided us with some ground-truth evidence of ad-
dresses that were owned by them. We also collected
three sets of tagging data (i.e., tags associated with ad-
dresses that describe their real-world owner): for Bitcoin
we used the data available from WalletExplorer,8 which
covers a wide variety of different Bitcoin-based services;
for Zcash we used hand-collected data from Kappos et
al. [6], which covers only exchanges; and for Ethereum
we used the data available from Etherscan,9 which cov-
ers a variety of services and contracts.
In order to understand the behavior of these trad-
ing platforms and the interaction they had with other
blockchain-based services such as exchanges, our first
8https://www.walletexplorer.com/
9https://etherscan.io/
instinct was to combine these tags with the now-
standard “multi-input” clustering heuristic for cryptocur-
rencies [17, 11], which states that in a transaction with
multiple input addresses, all inputs belong to the same
entity. When we applied this clustering heuristic to
an earlier version of our dataset [23], however, the re-
sults were fairly uneven. For Dogecoin, for example,
the three ShapeShift transactions we performed revealed
only three addresses, which each had done a very small
number of transactions. The three Changelly transac-
tions we performed, in contrast, revealed 24,893 ad-
dresses, which in total had received over 67 trillion
DOGE. These results suggest that the trading platforms
operate a number of different clusters in each cryptocur-
rency, and perhaps even change their behavior depending
on the currency, which in turns makes it clear that we did
not capture a comprehensive view of the activity of ei-
ther.
More worrying, in one of our Changelly transactions,
we received coins from a Ethereum address that had been
tagged as belonging to HitBTC, a prominent exchange.
This suggests that Changelly may occasionally operate
using exchange accounts, which would completely in-
validate the results of the clustering heuristic, as their in-
dividually operated addresses would end up in the same
cluster as all of the ones operated by HitBTC. We thus
decided not to use this type of clustering, and to instead
focus on a new clustering heuristic geared at identifying
common social relationships.
7.2 Common relationship heuristic
As it was clear that the multi-input heuristic would not
yield meaningful information about shared ownership,
we chose to switch our focus away from the interactions
ShapeShift had on the blockchain and look instead at
the relationships between individual ShapeShift users. In
particular, we defined the following heuristic:
Heuristic 7.1. If two or more addresses send coins to
the same address in the curOut blockchain, or if two
or more addresses receive coins from the same address
in the curIn blockchain, then these addresses have some
common social relationship.
The definition of a common social relationship is (in-
tentionally) vague, and the implications of this heuristic
are indeed less clear-cut than those of heuristics around
shared ownership. Nevertheless, we consider what it
means for two different addresses, in potentially two dif-
ferent blockchains, to have sent coins to the same ad-
dress; we refer to these addresses as belonging in the in-
put cluster of the output address (and analogously refer to
the output cluster for an address sending to multiple other
addresses). In the case in which the addresses are most
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closely linked, it could represent the same user consoli-
dating money held across different currencies into a sin-
gle one. It could also represent different users interacting
with a common service, such as an exchange. Finally, it
could simply be two users who do not know each other
directly but happen to be sending money to the same in-
dividual. What cannot be the case, however, is that the
addresses are not related in any way.
To implement this heuristic, we parsed transactions
into a graph where we defined a node as an address and
a directed edge (u,v) as existing when one address u ini-
tiated a ShapeShift transaction sending coins to v, which
we identified using the results of our pass-through anal-
ysis from Section 5. (This means that the inputs in our
graph are restricted to those for which we ran Phase 1 to
find the address, and thus that our input clusters contain
only the top 8 currencies. In the other direction, how-
ever, we obtain the address directly from the API, which
means output clusters can contain all currencies.) Edges
are further weighted by the number of transactions sent
from u to v. For each node, the cluster centered on that
address was then defined as all nodes adjacent to it (i.e.,
pointing towards it).
Performing this clustering generated a graph with
2,895,445 nodes (distinct addresses) and 2,244,459
edges. Sorting the clusters by in-degree reveals the en-
tities that received the highest number of ShapeShift
transactions (from the top 8 currencies, per our caveat
above). The largest cluster had 12,868 addresses —
many of them belonging to Ethereum, Litecoin, and
Dash — and was centered on a Bitcoin address belong-
ing to CoinPayments.net, a multi-coin payment process-
ing gateway. Of the ten largest clusters, three others (one
associated with Ripple and two with Bitcoin addresses)
are also connected with CoinPayments, which suggests
that ShapeShift is a popular platform amongst its users.
Sorting the individual clusters by out-degree reveals
instead the users who initiated the highest number of
ShapeShift transactions. Here the largest cluster (con-
sisting of 2314 addresses) was centered on a Litecoin
address, and the second largest cluster was centered on
an Ethereum address that belonged to Binance (a pop-
ular exchange). Of the ten largest clusters, two others
were centered on Binance-tagged addresses, and three
were centered on other exchanges (Freewallet, Gemini,
and Bittrex). While it makes sense that exchanges typ-
ically dominate on-chain activity in many cryptocurren-
cies, it is somewhat surprising to also observe that dom-
inance here, given that these exchanges already allow
users to shift between many different cryptocurrencies.
Aside from the potential for better rates or the percep-
tion of increased anonymity, it is thus unclear why a user
wanting to shift from one currency to another would do
so using ShapeShift as opposed to using the same service
with which they have already stored their coins.
Beyond these basic statistics, we apply this heuristic to
several of the case studies we investigate in the next sec-
tion. We also revisit here the large spike in the number of
U-turns that we observed in Section 6.2. Our hypothesis
then was that this spike was caused by a small number
of parties, due to the similar USD value carried by the
transactions and by the re-use of a small number of ad-
dresses across Dash, Ethereum, and Litecoin. Here we
briefly investigate this further by examining the clusters
centered on these addresses.
Of the 13 Dash addresses, all but one of them formed
small input and output clusters that were comprised of
addresses solely from Litecoin and Ethereum. Of the
9 Litecoin addresses, 6 had input clusters consisting
solely of Dash and Ethereum addresses, with two of them
consisting solely of Dash addresses. Finally, of the 4
Ethereum addresses, all of them had input clusters con-
sisting solely of Dash and Litecoin addresses. One of
them, however, had a diverse set of addresses in its out-
put cluster, belonging to Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, and a
number of Ethereum-based tokens. These results thus
still suggest a small number of parties, due to the tight
connection between the three currencies in the clusters,
although of course further investigation would be needed
to get a more complete picture.
8 Patterns of ShapeShift Usage
In this section, we examine potential applications of the
analysis developed in previous sections, in terms of iden-
tifying specific usages of ShapeShift. As before, our fo-
cus is on anonymity, and the potential that such platforms
may offer for money laundering or other illicit purposes,
as well as for trading. To this end, we begin by looking
at two case studies associated with explicitly criminal ac-
tivity and examine the interactions these criminals had
with the ShapeShift platform. We then switch in Sec-
tion 8.3 to look at non-criminal activity, by attempting
to identify trading bots that use ShapeShift and the pat-
terns they may create. Finally, in Section 8.4 we look
at the role that privacy coins (Monero, Zcash, and Dash)
play, in order to identify the extent to which the usage
of these coins in ShapeShift is motivated by a desire for
anonymity.
8.1 Starscape Capital
In January 2018, an investment firm called Starscape
Capital raised over 2,000 ETH (worth 2.2M USD at the
time) during their Initial Coin Offering, after promis-
ing users a 50% return in exchange for investing in their
cryptocurrency arbitrage fund. Shortly afterwards, all of
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their social media accounts disappeared, and it was re-
ported that an amount of ETH worth 517,000 USD was
sent from their wallet to ShapeShift, where it was shifted
into Monero [20].
We confirmed this for ourselves by observing that the
address known to be owned by Starscape Capital partic-
ipated in 192 Ethereum transactions across a three-day
span (January 19-21), during which it received and sent
2,038 ETH; in total it sent money in 133 transactions.
We found that 109 of these transactions sent money to
ShapeShift, and of these 103 were shifts to Monero con-
ducted on January 21 (the remaining 6 were shifts to
Ethereum). The total amount shifted into Monero was
465.61 ETH (1388.39 XMR), and all of the money was
shifted into only three different Monero addresses, of
which one received 70% of the resulting XMR. Using
the clusters defined in Section 7.2, we did not find ev-
idence of any other addresses (in any other currencies)
interacting with either the ETH or XMR addresses asso-
ciated with Starscape Capital.
8.2 Ethereum-based scams
EtherScamDB10 is a websitethat, based on user reports
that are manually investigated by its operators, collects
and lists Ethereum addresses that have been involved in
scams. As of January 30 2019, they had a total of 6374
scams listed, with 1973 associated addresses. We found
that 194 of these addresses (9% of those listed) had been
involved in 853 transactions to ShapeShift, of which 688
had a status field of complete. Across these successful
transactions, 1797 ETH was shifted to other currencies:
74% to Bitcoin, 19% to Monero, 3% to Bitcoin Cash,
and 1% to Zcash.
The scams which successfully shifted the highest vol-
umes belonged to so-called trust-trading and MyEther-
Wallet scams. Trust-trading is a scam based on the
premise that users who send coins prove the legiti-
macy of their addresses, after which the traders “trust”
their address and send back higher amounts (whereas
in fact most users send money and simply receive
nothing in return). This type of scam shifted over
918 ETH, the majority of which was converted to Bit-
coin (691 ETH, or 75%). A MyEtherWallet scam is a
phishing/typosquatting scam where scammers operate a
service with a similar name to the popular online wal-
let MyEtherWallet,11 in order to trick users into giving
them their account details. These scammers shifted the
majority of the stolen ETH to Bitcoin (207 ETH) and to
Monero (151 ETH).
Given that the majority of the overall stolen coins was
shifted to Bitcoin, we next investigated whether or not
10https://etherscamdb.info/
11https://www.myetherwallet.com/
these stolen coins could be tracked further using our anal-
ysis. In particular, we looked to see if they performed a
U-turn or a round-trip transaction, as discussed in Sec-
tion 6. We identified one address, associated with a
trust-trading scam, that participated in 34 distinct round-
trip transactions, all coming back to a different address
from the original one. All these transactions used Bit-
coin as curOut and used the same address in Bitcoin to
both receive and send coins; i.e., we identified the U-
turns in Bitcoin according to our address-based heuristic.
In total, more than 70 ETH were circulated across these
round-trip transactions.
8.3 Trading bots
ShapeShift, like any other cryptocurrency exchange, can
be used by traders who wish to take advantage of the
volatility in cryptocurrency prices. The potential advan-
tages of doing this via ShapeShift, as compared with
other platforms that focus more on the exchange be-
tween cryptocurrencies and fiat currencies, are that (1)
ShapeShift transactions can be easily automated via their
API, and (2) a single ShapeShift transaction acts to both
purchase desired coins and dump unwanted ones. Such
trading usually requires large volumes of transactions
and high precision on their the timing, due to the constant
fluctuation in cryptocurrency prices. We thus looked for
activity that involved large numbers of similar transac-
tions in a small time period, on the theory that it would
be associated primarily with trading bots.
We started by searching for sets of consecutive
ShapeShift transactions that carried approximately the
same value in curIn (with an error rate of 1%) and in-
volved the same currencies. When we did this, however,
we found thousands of such sets. We thus added the
extra conditions that there must be at least 15 transac-
tions in the set that took place in a span of five minutes;
i.e., that within a five-minute block of ShapeShift trans-
actions there were at least 15 involving the same curren-
cies and carrying the same approximate USD value. This
resulted in 107 such sets.
After obtaining our 107 trading clusters, we removed
transactions that we believed were false positives in that
they happened to have a similar value but were clearly
the odd one out. For example, in a cluster of 20 transac-
tions with 19 ETH-BTC transactions and one LTC-ZEC
transaction, we removed the latter. We were thus left
with clusters of either a particular pair (e.g., ETH-BTC)
or two pairs where the curOut or the curIn was the same
(e.g., ETH-BTC and ZEC-BTC), which suggests either
the purchase of a rising coin or the dump of a declining
one. We sought to further validate these clusters by us-
ing our heuristic from Section 7.2 to see if the clusters
shared common addresses. While we typically did not
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Figure 6: Our 107 clusters of likely trading bots, categorized by
the pair of currencies they trade between and the total amount
transacted by those clusters (in USD).
find this in UTXO-based currencies (as most entities op-
erate using many addresses), in account-based currencies
we found that in almost every case there was one partic-
ular address that was involved in the trading cluster.
We summarize our results in Figure 6, in terms of the
most common pairs of currencies and the total money ex-
changed by trading clusters using those currencies. It is
clear that the most common interactions are performed
between the most popular currencies overall, with the
exception of Monero (XMR) and SALT. In particular,
we found six clusters consisting of 17-20 transactions
that exchanged BTC for XMR, and 13 clusters that ex-
changed BTC for SALT, an Ethereum-based token. The
sizes of each trading cluster varied between 16 and 33
transactions and in total comprise 258 transactions, each
of which shifted exactly 0.1 BTC. In total they originated
from 514 different Bitcoin addresses, which may make it
appear as though different people carried out these trans-
actions. After applying our pass-through heuristic, how-
ever, we found that across all the transactions there were
only two distinct SALT addresses used to receive the out-
put. It is thus instead likely that this represents trading
activity involving one or two entities.
8.4 Usage of anonymity tools
Given the potential usage of ShapeShift for money laun-
dering or other criminal activities, we sought to under-
stand the extent to which its users seemed motivated to
hide the source of their funds. While using ShapeShift is
already one attempt at doing this, we focus here on the
combination of using ShapeShift and so-called “privacy
coins” (Dash, Monero, and Zcash) that are designed to
offer improved anonymity guarantees.
In terms of the effect of the introduction of KYC into
ShapeShift, the number of transactions using Zcash as
ShapeShift
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ShapeShift
phase 2
phase
 1
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 1
phase 1
phase 2
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Figure 7: The three types of interactions we investigated be-
tween ShapeShift and the shielded pool in Zcash.
curIn averaged 164 per day the month before, and av-
eraged 116 per day the month after. We also saw a
small decline with Zcash as curOut: 69 per day before
and 43 per day after. Monero and Dash, however, saw
much higher declines, and in fact saw the largest declines
across all eight cryptocurrencies. The daily average the
month before was 136 using Monero as curIn, whereas
it was 47 after. Similarly, the daily average using it as
curOut was 316 before and 62 after. For Dash, the daily
average as curIn was 128 before and 81 after, and the
daily average as curOut was 103 before and 42 after.
In terms of the blockchain data we had (according to
the most popular currencies), our analysis in what fol-
lows is restricted to Dash and Zcash, although we leave
an exploration of Monero as interesting future work.
8.4.1 Zcash
The main anonymity feature in Zcash is known as the
shielded pool. Briefly, transparent Zcash transactions be-
have just like Bitcoin transactions in that they reveal in
the clear the sender and recipient (according to so-called
t-addresses), as well as the value being sent. This in-
formation is hidden to various degrees, however, when
interacting with the pool. In particular, when putting
money into the pool the recipient is specified using a
so-called z-address, which hides the recipient but still
reveals the sender, and taking money out of the pool
hides the sender (through the use of zero-knowledge
proofs [2]) but reveals the recipient. Finally, Zcash is
designed to provide privacy mainly in the case in which
users transact within the shielded pool, which hides the
sender, recipient, and the value being sent.
We considered three possible interactions between
ShapeShift and the shielded pool, as depicted in Figure 7:
(1) a user shifts coins directly from ShapeShift into the
shielded pool, (2) a user shifts to a t-address but then uses
that t-address to put money into the pool, and (3) a user
sends money directly from the pool to ShapeShift.
For the first type of interaction, we found 29,003 trans-
actions that used ZEC as curOut. Of these, 758 had a
z-address as the output address, meaning coins were sent
directly to the shielded pool. The total value put into
the pool in these transactions was 6,707.86 ZEC, which
is 4.3% of all the ZEC received in pass-through transac-
tions. When attempting to use z-addresses in our own
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interactions with ShapeShift, however, we encountered
errors or were told to contact customer service. It is thus
not clear if usage of this feature is supported at the time
of writing.
For the second type of interaction, there were 1309
where the next transaction (i.e., the transaction in which
this UTXO spent its contents) involved putting money
into the pool. The total value put into the pool in these
transactions was 12,534 ZEC, which is 8.2% of all the
ZEC received in pass-through transactions.
For the third type of interaction, we found 111,041
pass-through transactions that used ZEC as curIn. Of
these, 3808 came directly from the pool, with a total
value of 22,490 ZEC (14% of all the ZEC sent in pass-
through transactions).
Thus, while the usage of the anonymity features in
Zcash was not necessarily a large fraction of the over-
all usage of Zcash in ShapeShift, there is clear potential
to move large amounts of Zcash (representing over 10
million USD at the time it was transacted) by combining
ShapeShift with the shielded pool.
8.4.2 Dash
As in Zcash, the “standard” transaction in Dash is simi-
lar to a Bitcoin transaction in terms of the information
it reveals. Its main anonymity feature —PrivateSend
transactions — are a type of CoinJoin [8]. A CoinJoin is
specifically designed to invalidate the multi-input clus-
tering heuristic described in Section 7, as it allows mul-
tiple users to come together and send coins to different
sets of recipients in a single transaction. If each sender
sends the same number of coins to their recipient, then it
is difficult to determine which input address corresponds
to which output address, thus severing the link between
an individual sender and recipient.
In a traditional CoinJoin, users must find each other in
some offline manner (e.g., an IRC channel) and form the
transaction together over several rounds of communica-
tion. This can be a cumbersome process, so Dash aims to
simplify it for users by automatically finding other users
for them and chaining multiple mixes together. In order
to ensure that users cannot accidentally de-anonymize
themselves by sending uniquely identifiable values, these
PrivateSend transactions are restricted to specific denom-
inations: 0.01, 0.1, 1, and 10 DASH. As observed by
Kalodner et al. [5], however, the CoinJoin denominations
often contain a fee of 0.0000001 DASH, which must be
factored in when searching for these transactions. Our
parameters for identifying a CoinJoin were thus that (1)
the transaction must have at least three inputs, (2) the
outputs must consist solely of values from the list of pos-
sible denominations (modulo the fees), and (3) and all
output values must be the same. In fact, given how Dash
operates there is always one output with a non-standard
value, so it was further necessary to relax the second and
third requirements to allow there to be at most one ad-
dress that does not carry the specified value.
We first looked to see how often the DASH sent to
ShapeShift had originated from a CoinJoin, which meant
identifying if the inputs of a Phase 1 transaction were
outputs from a CoinJoin. Out of 100,410 candidate trans-
actions, we found 2,068 that came from a CoinJoin, car-
rying a total of 11,929 DASH in value (6.5% of the total
value across transactions with Dash as curIn). Next, we
looked at whether or not users performed a CoinJoin after
receiving coins from ShapeShift, which meant identify-
ing if the outputs of a Phase 2 transaction had been spent
in a CoinJoin. Out of 50,545 candidate transactions, we
found only 33 CoinJoin transactions, carrying a total of
187 DASH in value (0.1% of the total value across trans-
actions using Dash as curOut).
If we revisit our results concerning the use of U-turns
in Dash from Section 6.2, we recall that there was a
large asymmetry in terms of the results of our two heuris-
tics: only 5.6% of the U-turns used the same UTXO, but
64.6% of U-turns used the same address. This suggests
that some additional on-chain transaction took place be-
tween the two ShapeShift transactions, and indeed upon
further inspection we identified many cases where this
transaction was a CoinJoin. There thus appears to have
been a genuine attempt to take advantage of the privacy
that Dash offers, but this was completely ineffective due
to the use of the same address that both sent and received
the mixed coins.
9 Conclusions
In this study, we presented a characterization of the us-
age of the ShapeShift trading platform over a thirteen-
month period, focusing on the ability to link together
the ledgers of multiple different cryptocurrencies. To ac-
complish this task, we looked at these trading platforms
from several different perspectives, ranging from the cor-
relations between the transactions they produce in the
cryptocurrency ledgers to the relationships they reveal
between seemingly distinct users. The techniques we de-
velop demonstrate that it is possible to capture complex
transactional behaviors and trace their activity even as
it moves across ledgers, which has implications for any
criminals attempting to use these platforms to obscure
their flow of money.
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